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Abstract 
This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) from a change in corporate control (takeover) do motivate some CEOs to 
seek acquisition of their firms by making them more attractive to a takeover bid. Using 
Australian and the US data, employing OLS regression, we report that there is a significant 
relationship between a CEOs change in control payments and their firm’s net cash levels (one 
of the key factors of takeover attractiveness). Our empirical results also indicate that CEOs 
desire their firms to be acquired by decreasing shareholders’ equity, thus supporting the view 
that change in control payments exist primarily for incumbent managers. Our findings 
provide support to the proposition that managers enjoy having large cash balances to be 
available to them as it allows them with greater opportunities to derive personal benefit from 
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it. Therefore, our findings suggest that managers prefer to have large cash balances available 
to them to ensure their future wellbeing by setting up favourable terms in the control 
agreements. 
Keywords: change in control payments, takeover attractiveness, equity holding, mergers and 
acquisitions, agency theory  
JEL Classifications: G34, G35 
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1. Introduction 
Media and popular opinions view managers of publicly listed companies as self-seekers, 
primarily out for their own gain at the expense of the shareholders (Smith, 2009). A prime 
example of such behaviour is observed in the mergers and acquisitions market. Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) that acquire other firms increase their own salaries while CEOs 
whose firms are taken over receive highly lucrative payouts (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). 
Lucrative payouts are termed ‘change in control payments’ and have become so large that it is 
nine times a CEO's annual salary (on an average basis) (Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 2004). 
In some cases, the change in control payment is similar to winning a first prize in a state 
lottery. The change in control payments is referred as ‘golden parachute’ (Hartzell et al, 2004) 
which is the payment made to the acquired firm’s CEO for terminating employment through 
no fault of their own. Termination of employment often arises when mergers and acquisitions 
takes place and the change in control payments allow CEOs of acquired firms to be 
financially unharmed, hence the name, golden parachutes. Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010) 
report that the presence of golden parachute increases the likelihood of takeover bids by 
245.4 per cent and increases the likelihood of acquisition by 28.4 per cent.  
The two key factors that make takeovers attractive are firm’s net cash levels and debt 
capacity (Powell and Thomas, 1994). However, a firm’s net cash balance and change in 
control payments are both depended on the managerial power. Jenson (1986) provided a link 
between managerial power and net cash balance by showing that firms with greater cash 
levels provide greater opportunities for CEOs to gain personally through perks such as 
company cars and large office space.  
However, the focus of the extant literature has been on investigating whether golden 
parachutes reduce risks for CEOs (Morrison, 1982; Maurer, 1984) or remove a CEO's 
motivation to sabotage an external takeover attempt (Morrison, 1982; Larcker and Lambert, 
1985). Therefore, little research has been undertaken to date that investigates whether the 
potential gains from golden parachutes actually motivate some CEOs to desire their firm to 
be taken over. This study is novel as it investigates whether the size of a change in control 
payments have become so large that it influences CEOs to actually desire their firm’s to be 
taken over.  
This study contributes to the literature in three distinct areas relating to finance that are, 
mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and capital structure. First, most studies 
relating to mergers and acquisitions argue from the acquiring firm’s viewpoint, that is, 
whether acquisitions are a wise investment or they simply exist to increase the acquiring 
CEOs power (see Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001). 
However, the research question that we propose “Do golden parachutes increase CEO’s 
desire for their firms to be taken over?” allows mergers and acquisitions to be viewed from 
the target firms’ perspective. If golden parachutes do increase CEOs desire for their firms to 
be taken over, it will have important implications for corporate governance issues and the 
board of directors will be interested to know what impact a CEO's motivation to seek 
acquisition will have on their firm. Moreover, shareholders may desire their firm to be taken 
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over for the reasons of the equity premiums as well. Therefore, it would be important to know 
if shareholders’ motivation for the merger and acquisitions is in fact aligned with the CEO’s 
desire to be taken over. Furthermore, the desire to be taken over may actually motivate CEO’s 
to alter the capital structure of their firm in such a way that it becomes attractive for takeovers 
(Powell and Thomas, 1994).  Finally, studies relating to mergers and acquisition have 
mainly been based on the UK or the US markets and therefore, little is known about the 
managerial behaviour relating to golden parachutes outside these countries. For our research, 
we include data from both Australia and the US which adds to our understanding regarding 
the effect of golden parachutes on CEOs motivation on a global basis.  
Our results show a positive association between net cash balances and golden parachutes, 
which to some extent explain the effects golden parachutes have on CEOs desire to be taken 
over. Our findings suggest that CEOs with power not only enjoy greater levels of cash but 
also ensure that their future financial wellbeing is taken care of by locking in large change in 
control payments. This finding is also supported by Jensen (1986), who state that the large 
change in control payments not only motivates CEOs to seek acquisition but also exists as an 
insurance policy for the incumbent manager against the acquisition market.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  Section II provides reviews of the extant 
literature on the subject of change in control payments. Section III provides the problem 
definition and motivation. Section IV describes the data sources and research method. Section 
V presents the empirical results and Section VI, conclusion.  
2. Literature Review 
The term ‘golden parachute’ stems from a broader field of corporate governance. For this 
reason, a majority of scholars have used agency theory paradigm to investigate the effects of 
golden parachutes on firm performance. Many researchers (see Grinstein and Hribar, 2004 
for details) have focused on acquirers; while a few have also studied the effect of golden 
parachute on the acquired firms as well (Hartzell et al., 2004). Morrison (1982) argues that 
CEOs whose firms are acquired often lose jobs which motivate them to find ways to reduce 
the possibility of such acquisitions. There are numerous options available to the CEOs and 
one of the most popular one is to delay and hinder progress of a takeover bid by influencing 
shareholders. Over the last decade or so only 18 per cent of the takeovers were hostile 
(Hartzell, et al., 2004), which indicate that most of the takeovers do require support of the 
incumbent managers to progress. Furthermore, empirical evidence show that acquisitions 
have largely benefited target companies shareholders (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Holland and 
Hodgkinson, 1994) and therefore, by resisting takeover attempts, CEOs can cost acquiring 
shareholders significant acquisition premiums. Minimizing the cost of the conflict between a 
CEOs desire to keep their job and shareholders’ wealth maximisation is one of the major 
reason for the existence of golden parachutes. Golden parachutes allow managers to 
objectively review takeover offers without having to be concerned about their own financial 
security, thus reducing agency costs (Morrison, 1982). Larcker and Lambert (1985) argue that 
golden parachutes allow firms to realign incentives of the CEOs with that of the shareholders. 
In support, Born and Trahan (1993) state that golden parachutes have a positive effect on 
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firms’ share prices, especially when a firm is previously considered to be ‘out of play’, that is, 
unlikely to be involved in a takeover. Therefore, the likelihood of takeover increases in firms 
that have golden parachutes (Machlin, Choe and Miles, 1993). Furthermore, takeovers 
provide larger premiums to the target firm’s shareholders that have golden parachutes in place 
compared to firms without golden parachutes. Other benefit of golden parachutes include 
firms ability to acquire and retain talented executives (Morrison, 1982); Maurer, 1984).  
However, Knoeber (1986) and Narayan and Sundaram (1998) state that golden parachutes are 
required by managers to hedge the risk associated with their employment contracts. Firms 
that have golden parachutes are on an average riskier than firms without golden parachutes 
(Almazan and Suarez, 2004; Narayan and Sundaram, 1998) and therefore, golden parachutes 
enable firms to have access to managers who otherwise see their position to be too risky 
( Pfeffer, 1973;  Provan, 1980).  
Firms without golden parachutes poses greater levels of risk compared to firms that have 
golden parachutes in place. For example, a firm without golden parachute will find it difficult 
to attract high achieving executives as they will not be willing to leave their existing firms 
which have golden parachutes. This is especially of concern for poor performing firms which 
are more likely to be the target of takeovers due to their relatively low cost. Moreover, current 
executives in firms without golden parachutes may leave in order to find employment in 
firms that have a greater financial security. For this reason, the likelihood of a manager 
leaving a firm increases during a takeover offer, thus leaving firm without a leader and 
making shareholders’ vulnerable (Maurer, 1984).  
To the contrary, Whisler (1984), Drucker (1974) and Lorsch (1989) argue that golden 
parachutes are forced on boards and shareholders who lack control of the firm. Managers that 
desire greater security for their financial wellbeing force their boards to give them assurances 
in the form of golden parachutes. Larcker and Lambert (1985) suggest that golden parachutes 
allow poor performing managers to shield themselves from the market discipline. Wade and 
O’Reilly (1990) reported that CEOs appoint more outsiders to the board so that they have a 
higher incidence of golden parachutes. Therefore, findings reported by Whisler (1984), 
Drucker (1974), Lorsch (1989), Larcker and Lambert (1985) and Wade and O’Reilly (1990) 
provide support to the view that CEOs who have more power on their firm have a higher 
tendency to use this power to ensure their financial future is secured through the use of 
golden parachutes. Furthermore, Domhoff (1978) and Ratcliff (1980) argue that golden 
parachutes are a pat on the back from the board of directors to the CEOs who are the 
members of the same social class. Such activities are often reported in the popular media and 
are referred to as corporate back scratching. Moreover, Singh and Harianto (1989) state that 
firms with golden parachute agreements have a higher tendency to have diffused share 
ownership structure, thus leading to greater board control. They also report that golden 
parachutes are related to greater CEO tenure relative to board tenure and having more 
external directors.  
According to Bowie and Fischer (1996), the benefits from golden parachutes are so large that 
they may encourage CEOs to actively solicit takeover regardless of the effect it has on the 
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shareholders. One of the largest sources of change in control payments for target CEOs is the 
equity premiums. When a firm is the target of a takeover, the acquiring firm is forced to pay 
equity premium to ensure that they are able to purchase a controlling stake in the firm 
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997). CEOs that hold large portions of a firm’s equity (due to stock 
options and the like) often gain substantially from the equity premium involved with a 
takeover (Hartzell et al., 2004).  
Hartzell et al. (2004), reported that on average, a target CEOs change in control payments are 
worth US$12 million, or nine times their annual salary, with one CEO in their sample even 
earning two hundred times his annual income. Around 80 per cent of CEOs whose firms are 
acquired in their sample ceased paid work, either retired or moved into a non-profit sector. 
Based on the findings reported by Hartzell et al. (2004), Maurer (984) and Bowie and Fischer 
(1996), we argue that large gains that are potentially available to CEOs under a change in 
control payments may indeed cause CEOs to desire their firms to be taken over.  
3. Change in Control Payment, Takeover Attractiveness and Control Variables 
To determine if substantial change in control payments causes CEOs to desire their firm to be 
taken over, we examine whether CEOs who stand to gain substantially from acquisitions are 
also in charge of firms which are more attractive to takeover bids. Similar to Simons (2002), 
we also examine whether CEOs desire to be taken over by looking at their actions. The view 
we have taken is that a CEO that has a large golden parachute available to them may get 
encouraged to desire their firms to be taken over.   
Since we are interested in the effects of golden parachute agreements (or potential payouts), 
our sample include firms that have been acquired and also firms that have large payouts 
available to CEOs that would motivate them to make their firms more attractive (whether or 
not a takeover actually eventuates). Our focus is on two variables that have potential to 
determine whether CEOs who stand to gain substantially from acquisitions are also in charge 
of firms that are more attractive to takeover bids, that is, the size of a CEO's change in control 
payments and the attractiveness of the CEO's firm to takeover bids.  
3.1 Change in Control Payments 
Hartzell et al. (2004) report that CEOs on an average receive US$8 million to US$11 million 
as a result of a change in control payments, which is approximately 9 to 16 times their 
average annual salary.  The primary source of the change in control payments are the 
amount of the equity premium paid by the acquiring firms. Since potential acquirers’ pay a 
premium above a company’s market stock price in order to gain control of the firm, stock 
price of an acquired firm rises which benefits the acquiring firms’ shareholders. Firms often 
pay their CEOs a large portion of their salary as equity to motivate them to improve the value 
of the firm, so when a firm is acquired and the stock price rises, a target CEO often gains 
substantially. According to Hartzell et al. (2004), equity premiums account for approximately 
half of a CEO’s gains due to acquisition (or about US$5 million on average). Hartzell et al. 
report that golden parachutes are the second largest source and represent about 20 per cent of 
a CEOs change in control payments, an average of US$1.5 million. About 69 per cent of 
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CEOs in 2004 had golden parachute agreements which required to be paid out should their 
employment ever be terminated through no fault of their own. 
The final major source of change in control payments occurs as a result of negotiations 
involved in the takeover process itself. Twenty seven per cent of CEOs are able to negotiate 
an additional takeover bonus worth on an average US$1.2 million, while 12 per cent manage 
to negotiate an augmentation to their standing golden parachutes agreement, again worth half 
a million dollars on an average basis. Additional negotiated bonuses makes up another 20 per 
cent of the takeover payments given to acquired CEOs. Hartzell et al. (2004) show that a 
CEO’s expected change in control payments, should they be acquired, can be estimated based 
on their existing equity ownership, change in control payments and an additional bonus worth 
about one and a half times their annual salary due to the negotiated benefits. Therefore, we 
use a similar method to Hartzell et al. (2004) to determine whether a CEO could gain 
substantially from an acquisition of their firm.  
3.2 Takeover Attractiveness 
In determining what makes a firm attractive to a takeover bid, many researchers have 
analysed firms that have been acquired in order to determine common characteristics that 
make a firm a likely target for a takeover bid. Motivated by Jensen (1986), many researchers 
have focused on the view that mergers and acquisitions are a mean of replacing poorly 
performing managers. Managers that exert large agency costs on their firms eventually lower 
the value of their firms to such a point that the firm will be acquired at a bargain price and the 
management team will be replaced. Martin and McConnell (1991), Palepu (1986) and Powell 
and Thomas (1994) found that firms with low stock performance have an increased 
likelihood of takeover. Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Hasbrouck (1985) have 
reported similar results using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance. 
To the contrary, Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) found that past performance has no effect on 
takeover likelihood in the UK. Similarly, Alcade and Espitia (2003) found no support for the 
view that acquisitions exist to replace incumbent managers in Spanish companies.  
The conflicting empirical evidence relating to firm performance and takeover suggest that 
debate whether takeovers lead to better performance is far from being over. Although poor 
past performance would reduce a firm’s value and make the firm more attractive for a 
takeover, reducing firm value would be counterproductive to a CEO looking for their firms to 
be taken over. Since the primary source of change in control payments is the equity premium 
(Hartzell et al 2004), reducing the value of the firm in order to attract a takeover bid would 
hurt CEOs own payout as it would reduce the value of their personal equity.  
Palepu (1986), Hasbrouck (1985), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Berger and Ofek (1996) 
and Aaronovich (1981) find that firm size is a key factor that increases takeover likelihood. 
They argue that smaller firms are cheaper to buy and as such, are more attractive to takeover 
targets. However, reducing a firm’s size in order to attract a takeover bid would be 
counterproductive for a CEO who is looking to cash-in on the change in control payments. 
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Any reduction in firm size would not only lower the CEO’s equity value but would also result 
in reducing their salary as well (Hartzell et al 2004, Jensen 1986). 
Arguably, a CEO wishing to reap the benefits of change in control payments without reducing 
the value of their own rewards can be achieved through cash and leverage. Palepu (1986), 
Holland and Hodgkinson (1994), Powell and Thomas (1994), Lehn and Poulsen (1989) all 
promote the notion that ‘resource rich firms’ are more attractive takeover targets. Mergers and 
acquisitions are often very costly and if firms’ that are acquired have large resources available, 
it can be used to recoup some of the costs of the acquisition. Firms with large cash balances 
are attractive for takeovers as cash can be used for other projects after acquisition. Likewise, 
firms with low leverage are attractive as well, excess debt capacity can be utilised by raising 
debt levels to increase cash balances and help make up for the costly acquisition process.1 
Once the firm is acquired, the extra cash is used to pay back some of the debt while the rest 
of the debt is now owed by a much larger combined firm, making the debt comparatively 
smaller. 
Based on the information provided  above, we measure a firm’s attractiveness to a takeover 
bid as the value of their cash balances, leverage and as well as a combined factor 
incorporating both variables. 
3.3 Control Variables 
To determine the effect of the level of payout a CEO is entitled to receive after acquisition, 
the change in control payments is captured by the variable PayoutFactor. PayoutFactor is an 
estimate of a CEOs change in control payment divided by their annual compensation. The 
estimate for the change in control payment is the function of a CEOs shareholding in the 
existing golden parachutes and the annual compensation is the CEOs annual salary. 
SalaryAnnual
nAcquisitioafterPayoutExpectedorPayoutFact   
Miller and Modigliani (1963) argue that debt generally has a lower cost than equity and 
therefore, firms should aim to increase their leverage whenever possible. However, a higher 
debt level leads to greater risk of bankruptcy or financial distress should they be unable to 
meet their interest obligations. The tradeoff theory states that firms’ tradeoff the borrowing 
costs and bankruptcy costs against each other to arrive at an optimal debt and equity ratio for 
the firms (Scott, 1976). A key factor that explains a firm’s debt level is the firm’s financial 
distress costs. According to John (1993) and Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), factors 
affecting firms’ financial distress costs are the earnings and cash flow volatility. Essentially 
firms that have high volatile cash flows are more unlikely to meet their interest obligations in 
a specific year due to the uncertainty regarding their income. Furthermore, research regarding 
the reasons for holding high cash balances largely focus on the risk of becoming insolvent. 
Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Meltzer (1963) and Miller and Orr (1966) state that firms hold 
                                                        
1 An extreme case of such takeovers are leveraged buyouts (LBOs) (Damodaran, 2005) where the acquiring firm accrues a 
large amount of debt in order to acquire a target firm with high cash balances and low leverage. 
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cash to avoid being short on liquid assets when needed. Moreover, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (1999) report that a firm’s desire to hold cash is increased when a firm finds 
it difficult to raise external funds. Therefore, a firm’s desire to hold cash can be partly 
estimated by their volatility of cash flows. Firms with inherently volatile cash flows are more 
likely to be at risk of insolvency (Miller and Orr, 1966). We also use risk of cash flows as a 
proxy for the risk of insolvency. To control for the effects of tradeoff theory on debt and risk 
of insolvency, we include two proxies, that is, firm’s volatility of cash flows (FCFVAR) and 
earnings (NPVAR). FCFVAR is volatility of firm’s cash flow over the last three years and 
NPVAR is the volatility of firm’s net profit over the last three years.  
Similarly, a high financially performing firm will create more value for the CEO than a low 
performing firm. To capture the effects of performance on change in control payments, we 
have used Tobin’s Q as a proxy for performance. Tobin’s Q is measured as follows: 
AssetsTotal
DebtL/TDebtCurentNetgOutstandinSharesofNo.*PriceQsTobin'   
To control for the endogeneity effect, we also use an interaction term (InterQ) which is 
determined by multiplying FactorPayout by Tobin’s Q.2 
Because CEOs know more about their firm than the outsiders, there is a potential of the 
existence of information asymmetry when firms apply for outside financing. The pecking 
order theory postulated by Myers and Majluf (1984) state that executives prefer to fund 
projects first with cash, then with debt, and use equity as a last resort due to the higher degree 
of information asymmetry associated with it. Helwege and Liang (1996) and Graham and 
Harvey (2001) show that more information is known about larger firms and those that pay 
dividends and therefore, have a lower degree of information asymmetry. Based on this view, 
we also use both firm size and dividend payout ratio as potential explanation for capital 
structure. We use natural log of total assets (LnTA) as a proxy for firm size and the ratio of 
dividend paid divided by net profit of the firm (divPOUT) as a proxy for dividend payout. 
Fowley, Hartzell Titman and Twite (2007), state that industry also plays an important part in 
determining firms’ cash balances and capital structure. A firm’s industry affects the firm’s 
stability and thus their need to hold cash and financial distress costs. For this reason, we have 
also included industry dummies in our analysis. We have created seven industry dummy 
variables where IND is equal to “1” if firm belongs to industrials, otherwise “0”; HC is equal 
to “1” if firm belongs to Health care, otherwise “0”; CS is equal to “1” if firm belongs to 
consumer services, otherwise “0”; TECH is equal to “1” if firm belongs to technology, 
otherwise “0”; CG is equal to “1” if firm belongs to consumer goods, otherwise “0”; and 
O&G is equal to “1” if firm belongs to oil & gas, otherwise “0”. The industry the firm 
belongs to is determined by the Datastream industry identifier.  
                                                        
2 We thank the anonymous reviewers who suggested adding performance measure and as well as an interaction term. 
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Table 1 provides a summary of the variables used and its measurement. 
Table 1. Variable and Measurement 
 
Variables  Measurement 
%Equity Total equity/Total debt  
Net cash Net cash divided by the firm’s total assets. Net cash is the firms’ total cash balances 
less any cash debts. 
Attractiveness ToTakeover NetCash + %Equity 
CEO share holdings Reported SEC value for the chief executives total shares divided by the total 
number of shares in the firm. 
CEO existing golden 
parachutes 
Reported SEC value for any payments listed as potential payouts under termination 
without cause or change of control. The value has been normalised for size by 
dividing it by the respective firm's total assets. 
CEO Yearly Salary Reported SEC value for the total income of the CEO including expected value of 
equity payments. The value has been normalised for size by dividing it by the 
respective firm's total assets. 
PayoutFactor An estimate of a CEOs change in control payout divided by their annual 
compensation. The estimate of change in control payments is a function of CEO 
share holdings existing golden parachutes 
LnTA Natural log of total assets. 
divPOUT  Dividend payout ratio - accounting value for the amount of dividends paid in the 
year divided by the total net profit of the firm. 
FCFVar Cash flow volatility - volatility over the last three years of the firms accounting 
value for total cash flows. 
NPVar Earnings volatility - volatility over the last three years of the firms accounting value 
for the total net profit of the firm. 
Tobin’s Q (Price * No of Shares Outstanding + Net Current Debt + L/T Debt)/Total Assets 
InterQ FactorPayout * Tobin’s Q 
Industry Firms are divided into seven key industries: industrials (IND), health care (HC), 
consumer services (CS), technology (TECH), financials (FINA), consumer services 
(CS), and oil & gas (O&G).  
*Accounting variables sourced from DataStream database, SEC values received from proxy statements from the SEC 
website. 
 
4. Data, Methodology and Research Method  
Our sample includes 250 US firms and 100 Australian firms for the financial year 2009 from 
the S&P500 and AX200 indices, respectively. Data was collated from three major sources. 
Accounting data, such as data required to measure firm attractiveness and control variables, 
was collated from the DataStream database. In the US, firms are required to submit 
information on CEO compensation and equity ownership in proxy statements to the 
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Securities and Exchange Commission and therefore, the change in control payments was 
collated individually for each firm from the proxy statements. For the Australian companies, 
executive compensation and security ownership information was collected from individual 
firms’ annual statements. 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to determine the relationship between change 
in control payments and attractiveness. Three key regression analyses is undertaken: (i) the 
link between change in control payments and net cash; (ii) the link between change in control 
payments and debt, and (iii) the link between change in control payments and an 
attractiveness factor made up of both net cash and debt levels. 
Expected change in control payments are estimated based on CEO shareholdings, existing 
golden parachute agreements and their existing annual compensation similar to that reported 
by Hartzell et al. (2004). First, the value of the CEOs shareholdings is multiplied by an 
expected equity premium of 22 per cent based on findings reported Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
and Holland and Hodgkinson (1994). Second, existing golden parachutes values are then 
added and are taken at their expected value as found in SEC filings for the US companies or 
annual report for Australian firms. Hartzell et al. (2004) also find that 27 per cent of CEOs 
manage to negotiate takeover bonuses equal to 1.5 times their annual salary. Thus, the 
expected value of this possibility is also added to the expected change in control payments. 
Finally, Hartzell et al. (2004) shows that 8.6 per cent of CEOs with golden parachutes and 
19.3 per cent of CEOs without golden parachutes manage to negotiate an augmentation to 
their existing golden parachutes agreements. The value of this change in agreements is 
generally equal to the CEOs annual compensation. The expected value of change in 
agreements is also added to the CEOs expected change in control payments. The total 
expected change in control payment is then normalised by dividing it by the CEOs annual 
salary to make an expected payout factor. 
The attractiveness factor is created by examining a firm’s relative levels of net cash and debt. 
Firms are ranked first by net cash/total assets and divided into three groups. The top third of 
firms are given a net cash score of three, the second third a score of two, and so on. This 
process is repeated for a firm’s debt/total assets. A firm’s total attractiveness score is then 
given by the combination of these two scores. This method of factor creation is similar to that 
used by Grinstein and Hribar (2004) which enable us to examine separately the link between 
change in control payments, net cash, debt and total attractiveness. 
Our empirical model is formulated a follows: 
1..........εIndustry
NPVarFCFVardivPOUTAssetsTotalPayoutacotPaymentsControlinChange


 
where,  
Change in Control Payments = either AttractivenessToTakeover, NetCash or %Equity 
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A firm’s AttractivenessToTakeover is a combination of NetCash and %Equity. NetCash is Net 
Cash/Total Assets and %Equity is Total Equity/Total Debt.  
5. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports the compensation statistics of the sampled firms. Our results show that change 
in control payments on an average are 11.5 times a CEO’s annual salary compared to nine 
times report by Hartzell et al. (2004). The average salary of a CEO in the US is US$10.51 
million and the average payout is US$54 million. However, there is a large variation in the 
actual salary depending on the relative size of the firms. Australian results show similar trend 
to the US, but is of much lower magnitude. This is not surprising as the firms in Australian 
are about 50 per cent the size of the US firms when measured by total assets. The mean 
(median) values for Tobin’s Q are 1.53 (1.21) indicate that firms in both countries (Australia 
and the US) have created value for the shareholders which are greater than one. 
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Table 2. Compensation Statistics 
Sample Variable Units Mean Median Min Max S.E Count 
All 
Total 
Compensation 
$M 8.8 7.3 0.3 100.1 0.5 332 
  
Change in 
Control 
$M 14.0 10.4 0.0 125.5 1.0 332 
  Total Shares M 5.0 1.1 0.0 217.7 1.2 332 
  
Estimated 
Payout 
$M 45.3 24.6 0.7 1620.6 7.1 332 
  PayoutFactor $ 4.7 3.9 0.3 45.7 4.6 332 
  Total Assets $M 32.2 7.9 0.1 2322.0 9.9 332 
 Tobin’s Q Ratio 1.53 1.21 0.50 8.32 0.94 332 
AUS 
Total 
Compensation 
$ 4.7 3.9 0.3 45.7 0.3 100 
  
Change in 
Control 
$M 7.3 5.7 0.0 57.3 0.5 100 
  Total Shares M 2.8 0.6 0.0 99.3 0.7 100 
  
Estimated 
Payout 
$M 25.1 13.0 0.7 739.3 3.8 100 
  PayoutFactor $ 5.3 1.4 0.3 576.8 2.6 100 
  Total Assets $M 17.6 2.3 0.1 617.4 8.0 100 
 Tobin’s Q Ratio 1.56 1.10 0.50 8.32 1.23 100 
US 
Total 
Compensation 
$M 10.5 8.8 0.6 100.1 0.6 232 
  
Change in 
Control 
$M 16.8 12.5 0.0 126.0 1.1 232 
  Total Shares M 5.9 1.4 0.0 218.0 1.4 232 
  
Estimated 
Payout 
$M 54.00 29.6 1.6 1620.6 8.5 232 
  PayoutFactor $ 11.4 3.2 0.60 1264.3 5.5 232 
  Total Assets $M 38.5 10.4 0.8 2322.0 10.7 232 
 Tobin’s Q Ratio 1.52 1.27 0.71 6.12 0.79 232 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficient of the independent variables used in this study. A 
correlation less than 0.8 are generally considered to be appropriate for regression analysis 
(Field, 2008). Most of the correlation coefficients reported in Table 3 are less than 0.5, apart 
for the correlation between the FCFVar and NPVar which is 0.740. Also, our tests for 
multicollinearity3 show that there are no serial correlation issues in the data. Our test for 
autocorrelation also resulted to be negative as well. We have reported bootstrap standard 
                                                        
3 Not provided. However, results can be obtained from the authors if required. To improve robustness, we have also reported 
bootstrap standard errors as well.  
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errors which have a tendency to minimise the effect of heteroskedasticity when sample size is 
small.  
Table 3. Partial Correlation Results for the Independent Variables 
PayoutFactor (PF) is an estimate of a CEOs change in control payment divided by their annual compensation and change in control payment is the function of CEOs share 
holdings in their existing golden parachutes. TA is the natural log of the total assets. NPVAR is the volatility of the last three years of the firms accounting net profit. FCF 
VAR is the volatility of the last three years firms accounting total cash flows. DivPOUT is the dividends paid in the year divided by total net profit for the firm. Tobin’s Q 
(Q) is the ratio of (Price * No. of shares outstanding + Net Current Debt + L/T Debt) to total assets. IND indicate firm belonging to the Industrial sector, HC indicate 
Healthcare sector, CS indicate Consumer Services, TECH indicate Technology, FINA indicate Financials, CG indicate Consumer Goods and O&G indicate Oil and Gas. 
 PF TA NP VAR 
FCF 
VAR 
Div 
POUT 
Q 
IND HC CS Tech FINA CG O&G
PayoutFactor 
(PF) 
----     
 
       
Total Assets 
(TA) 
-0.0144 
(0.794) 
-    
 
       
NP VAR 
-0.004 
(0.945) 
-0.185***
(0.000) 
-   
 
       
FCF VAR 
0.004 
(0.946) 
-0.357***
(0.000) 
0.740*** 
(0.000) 
-  
 
       
DivPOUT 
-0.021 
(0.708) 
-0.087 
(0.116) 
0.003 
(0.957) 
-0.031 
(0.5790 
- 
 
       
Q 
0.064 
(0.248) 
-0.390***
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
-0.071 
(0.199) 
 
- 
       
Industrials 
(IND) 
-0.019 
(0.719) 
0.066 
(0.229) 
-0.026 
(0.637) 
-0.063 
(0.250) 
-0.075 
(0.172)
-0.034 
(0.543) 
-       
Health Care 
(HC) 
-0.016 
(0.773) 
0.059 
(0.285) 
-0.019 
(0.722) 
-0.047 
(0.392) 
-0.079 
(0.152)
0.237*** 
(0.000) 
-0.097† 
(0.076) 
-      
Consumer 
Services 
(CS) 
-0.012 
(0.825) 
0.042 
(0.442) 
-0.019 
(0.733) 
-0.045 
(0.418) 
-0.080 
(0.145)
0.043 
(0.438) 
-0.099† 
(0.070) 
-0.079 
(0.148)
-     
Technology 
(TECH) 
-0.016 
(0.770) 
0.009 
(0.860) 
-0.021 
(0.708) 
-0.046 
(0.401) 
-0.091†
(0.098)
0.118** 
(0.32) 
-0.102† 
(0.064) 
-0.081 
(0.139)
-0.083 
(0.130)
-    
Financials 
(FINA) 
-0.019 
(0.718) 
0.296*** 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.639 
-0.070 
(0.201) 
0.041 
(0.458)
-0.252***
(0.000) 
-0.122**
(0.027) 
-0.097†
(0.077)
-0.099†
(0.070)
-0.102† 
(0.064) 
-   
Consumer 
Goods (CG) 
-0.017 
(0.753) 
0.008 
(0.880) 
-0.021 
(0.701) 
-0.041 
(0.447) 
-0.044 
(0.422)
-0.017 
(0.761) 
-0.106† 
(0.054) 
-0.085 
(0.115)
-0.087 
(0.108)
-0.089 
(0.108) 
-0.106† 
(0.054) 
-  
Oil & Gas 
(O&G) 
-0.014 
(0.8010 
0.121** 
(0.028) 
-0.017 
(0.761) 
-0.035 
(0.523) 
-0.077 
(0.163)
0.076 
(0.165 
-0.086 
(0.118) 
-0.069 
(0.211)
-0.070 
(0.201)
-0.072 
(0.192) 
-0.086 
(0.118) 
-0.075 
(0.174)
- 
*** denote significance at 1% level, ** denote significance at 5% level and† denote significance at 10% level. 
 
In determining whether a CEO has potentially attempted to make their firm more attractive as 
a takeover target, we regress three exogenous attractiveness variables (NetCash or %Equity, 
AttractivenessToTakeover) against the potential payout given to a CEO under acquisition. 
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Table 4 report the results of the regression analysis between a firm’s net cash/total assets as 
the dependent variable.  
Table 4. Net Cash Regression Estimate 
 US 
BootstrapSt
d. Errors 
AUS 
Robust Std. 
Errors 
Combined 
Bootstrap 
Std. Errors 
Intercept 
0.201† 
(1.85) 
0.127 
0.499** 
(2.23) 
0.223 
0.433*** 
(3.19) 
0.136 
Payout 
Factor 
0.001*** 
(4.74) 
0.000 
0.013† 
(1.76) 
0.011 
0.001*** 
(5.83) 
0.000 
Total Assets 
-0.007** 
(-2.11) 
0.007 
-0.027** 
(-2.07) 
0.013 
-0.028*** 
(-3.53) 
0.007 
NPVAR 
0.036** 
(2.35) 
0.101 
0.009** 
(2.96) 
0.003 
0.008*** 
(4.35) 
0.002 
FCFVAR 
-0.253 
(-0.93) 
0.272 
-0.038 
(-0.95) 
0.039 
-0.018 
(-0.44) 
0.041 
divPOUT 
-0.005 
(-1.20) 
0.004 
-0.008 
(-1.39) 
0.005 
-0.012** 
(-2.96) 
0.004 
Q 
-0.193*** 
(-6.77) 
0.029 
-0.199*** 
(-3.53) 
0.056 
-0.047*** 
(-3.63) 
0.013 
InterQ 
0.043*** 
(9.22) 
0.005 
0.042*** 
(4.25) 
0.009 
0.001*** 
(5.79) 
0.000 
Industrials 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.023 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
0.046 
-0.010 
(-0.38) 
0.026 
Health Care 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.025 
0.029 
(0.35) 
0.083 
0.044 
(1.26) 
0.035 
Consumer 
Services 
-0.018 
(-0.77) 
0.023 
0.017 
(0.24) 
0.072 
-0.010 
-0.34) 
0.029 
Technology 
0.124*** 
(3.91) 
0.031 
-0.032 
(-0.33) 
0.096 
0.183*** 
(5.00) 
0.036 
Financials 
0.055† 
(1.87) 
0.029 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.048 
0.026 
(0.89) 
0.029 
Consumer 
Goods 
0.043** 
(1.98) 
0.022 
-0.079 
(-1.08) 
0.073 
-0.015 
(-0.45) 
0.034 
Oil & Gas 
-0.016 
(-0.75) 
0.021 
0.064 
(0.65) 
0.098 
0.054 
(1.37) 
0.039 
R2 
(Adj. R2) 
0.54 
(0.51)) 
 
0.53 
(0.45) 
 
0.35 
(0.32) 
 
Wald 
χ2 (14) 
250.31*** 
(0.000) 
 
34.93** 
(0.001) 
 
127.45*** 
(0.000) 
 
Sample  
Size 
232  100  332  
†, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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The regression estimates for the US is provided in column 2, Australia in column 3 and 
combined data in column 4 in Table 4. Results show that a CEO’s payout (PayoutFactor) is 
statistically significant at 1% level, thus indicate that existence of golden parachutes increases 
the level of net cash balance in firms. There are a number of plausible reasons for this 
outcome. First, CEOs are attracted to extremely large payouts under a change in control 
payments and therefore alter their firm’s cash balances in order to entice a potential acquirer. 
A higher cash balance helps to offset the costs of acquisition, thus increasing the likelihood of 
a takeover and likelihood of a CEO getting paid out. This explanation is consistent with view 
provided by Jensen (1986) that managers are predominantly self-seekers or it is a reward for 
social status (Domhoff, 1978; Ratcliff, 1980). Second view is that firms with greater cash 
balances are more likely to offer large change in control payouts because they have the cash 
balances to do so. This explanation supports the view that change in control payment may 
exists to gain access to executive talent (Morrison, 1982; Maurer, 1984). Third view is that 
firms tend to hold larger cash balances to offset their own internal risks due to volatile cash 
flows (Miller and Orr, 1966; Karni, 1973). Having large change in control agreements in 
place for executives would most likely worsen the cash flow volatility as the firm would be 
required to payout significant amount of cash if CEOs employment is terminated. This view 
is supported by our results where the coefficient of the earnings volatility (NPVar) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. This indicates that high 
earnings volatility leads to higher net cash balances.  
The firm performance measure Tobin’s Q has a negative coefficient and is statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level. This shows that Tobin’s Q has a negative effect on the net cash 
balances. Firms may have invested more resources to increase value which may have 
required using cash. However, the coefficient of the InterQ (interaction between PayoutFactor 
and Tobin’s Q) is positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent and 10 per cent, 
respectively. The results for InterQ indicate that as value of the firm increases, the CEOs 
expected payout also increases. 
Results for the industry dummy variables are interesting to note. Result for the US show that 
technology, financials and consumer goods sectors have positive coefficients and are 
statistically significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent. This suggests that firms in 
these industries hold more cash compared to other industries. A plausible reason could be that 
these industries have long lag time between research and payouts which may require them to 
hold a greater amount of cash than similar sized firms in other industries. 
In investigating which of the three explanations stated above holds the greatest weight, we 
examine the firm’s capital structure as the second attractiveness variable, that is, how much of 
the firm’s assets are owned by firm’s equityholders. A firm with more equity is considered 
more attractive as a takeover target as the acquiring firm can increase the amount of debt in a 
firm in order to raise cash after the costly acquisition process.  
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Table 5. Equity Percentage Regression Estimate 
 U.S 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
AUS 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
Combined 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
Intercept 1.037*** 
(7.76) 
0.134 
1.140*** 
(5.82) 
0.177 
1.27*** 
(10.62) 
0.120 
Payout 
Factor 
-0.001*** 
(-2.28) 
0.000 
-0.006*** 
(-3.36) 
0.014 
-0.011*** 
(-8.01) 
0.000 
Total Assets -0.037*** 
(-4.80* 
0.008 
-0.035** 
(-2.62) 
0.013 
-0.058*** 
(-8.04) 
0.007 
NPVAR -0.219** 
(-2.05) 
0.107 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
0.002 
0.001 
(0.47) 
0.003 
FCFVAR -0.599† 
(-1.89) 
0.317 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.041 
-0.024 
(-0.49) 
0.049 
divPOUT 0.003 
(0.69) 
0.004 
0.017 
(1.51) 
0.013 
0.006 
(0.68) 
0.009 
Q -0.289*** 
(-9.29) 
0.031 
-0.575*** 
(-5.80) 
0.099 
0.017 
(0.92) 
0.019 
InterQ 0.061*** 
(12.87) 
0.005 
0.098*** 
(6.67) 
0.014 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
0.000 
Industrials 0.013 
(0.58) 
0.023 
0.035 
(0.60) 
0.058 
0.011 
(0.36) 
0.032 
Health Care 0.042 
(1.18) 
0.035 
0.115† 
(1.75) 
1.465 
0.132** 
(2.85) 
0.046 
Consumer 
Services 
0.042 
(1.33) 
0.031 
0.004 
(0.04) 
0.104 
-0.017 
(-0.30) 
0.058 
Technology 0.072** 
(1.99) 
0.036 
0.009 
(0.10) 
0.087 
0.176*** 
(3.64) 
0.048 
Financials -0.066** 
(-2.40) 
0.027 
-0.072 
(-1.39) 
0.052 
-0.068** 
(-2.03) 
0.033 
Consumer 
Goods 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.029 
-0.007 
(-0.09) 
0.074 
-0.058 
(-1.62) 
0.037 
Oil & Gas 0.081** 
(2.51) 
0.032 
0.105 
(1.51) 
0.069 
0.129** 
(2.99) 
0.043 
R2 
(Adj. R2) 
0.69 
(0.67) 
 
0.66 
(0.61) 
 
0.34 
(0.31) 
 
Wald 
χ2 (14) 
475.03*** 
(0.000) 
 
177.63*** 
(0.000) 
 
191.04*** 
(0.000) 
 
Sample Size 232  100  332  
         †, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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The results reported in Table 5 show that PayoutFactor has a negative coefficient and is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level in all the three cases (columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 5). 
This indicates that as PayoutFactor increases, the total shareholders’ equity decreases, 
therefore, decreasing shareholders voting power. This supports the view that high golden 
parachutes do alter firm’s attractiveness via change in the capital structure. According to 
Murphy (1999), incumbent managers prefer a firm with debt as this would allow the firm to 
hold greater total assets which is a primary determinant of executive compensation (Murphy 
1999). Since our results reported in Table 5 examine the effects on capital structure and not 
net cash, we do not provide any explanation for whether high cash balance increases 
probability for having managerial talent. However, our results do provide support to the third 
explanation, that is, managers that have greater influence have greater gain from the change 
in control agreements as an insurance policy. Overall, our results in Table 5 for the analysis of 
the link between capital structure and change in control payments do support the view that 
managers can alter their firm’s capital structure to attract takeover bids.  
Our results are interesting in relation to the results reported by Miller and Modigliani (1963) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984). Miller and Modigliani state that firms arrive at a target capital 
structure through the tradeoff play between the lower cost of debt financing and the potential 
distress costs of bankruptcy. The distress costs are higher in firms with more variable incomes 
and cash flows. Since our results for both NPVAR and FCFVAR are not significant, it 
indicates that the distress costs are not relevant for these firms as they hold high cash 
balances anyway. 
The pecking order theory states that firms prefer to fund projects with cash, then debt, before 
finally issuing equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that this is due to information 
asymmetry causing firm’s equity to be undervalued. They also suggest that large firms and 
those with greater dividend payouts suffer less from information asymmetry, thus indicating 
that there should be a link between firm size, dividend payout and capital structure. Our 
results show that LnTA has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 1 per cent 
level, indicating large firms tend to have high debt financed compared to equity financed. 
However, the relationship between dividend payouts and capital structure is not statistically 
significant, thus providing limited support for Myers and Majluf theory. 
Industry specific results show that industrial, healthcare, technology, consumer services and, 
oil and gas have statistically significant results. The results show that a firm in each of these 
industries is likely to have a higher equity to debt ratio and thus, more equity financed.  
Results for the regression analysis between a firm’s attractiveness as a takeover target and the 
potential payouts available to a CEO under a change in control are reported in Table 6. The 
attractiveness factor is a combination of both a firm’s net cash balance and its capital 
structure. A firm that is high in both areas will have a higher attractiveness factor.  
The results reported in Table 6 (columns 2, 3 and 4) indicate that PayoutFactor has no effect 
on the firm’s attractiveness. Our results reported InterQ is similar to that reported in Table 4. 
The results indicate that firms with higher firm have higher payout compared to low 
performing firms. However, the results do indicate that the greatest cause of a firm’s 
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attractiveness as a takeover target is the industry in which it operates. This is also supported 
by Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) who reported that merger and acquisition activities are 
concentrated in a few key industries and economic sectors. Those industries are industrial, 
healthcare, technology and the oil and gas industries. 
Table 6. Attractiveness Factor Regression Estimate 
 US 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
AUS 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
Combined 
Bootstrap 
Std. 
Errors 
Intercept 
7.019*** 
(11.21) 
0.626 
2.228*** 
(8.56) 
0.260 
7.57*** 
(10.97) 
0.690 
Payout 
Factor 
0.000 
(0.44) 
0.000 
0.017 
(0.69) 
0.025 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
0.000 
Total Assets 
-0.167*** 
(-5.16) 
0.032 
-0.048** 
(-2.93) 
0.016 
-0.268*** 
(-6.67) 
0.040 
NP VAR 
-1.498** 
(-2.04) 
0.735 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.004 
0.002 
(0.12) 
0.012 
FCF VAR 
0.437 
(0.30) 
1.442 
-0.036 
(-0.56) 
0.065 
-0.017 
(-0.07) 
0.236 
divPOUT 
-0.008 
(-0.46) 
0.017 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.007 
-0.041 
(-1.27) 
0.033 
Q 
-2.562*** 
(-10.62) 
0.241 
-0.666*** 
(-8.29) 
0.080 
-0.197** 
(-2.84) 
0.069 
InterQ 
0.503*** 
(14.69) 
0.034 
0.122*** 
(8.30) 
0.015 
0.001† 
(1.93) 
0.000 
Industrials 
0.333*** 
(3.07) 
0.108 
-0.058 
(-0.76) 
0.077 
0.207 
(0.97) 
0.214 
Health Care 
0.559*** 
(3.49) 
0.160 
0.188 
(1.39) 
0.135 
1.085*** 
(3.97) 
0.273 
Consumer 
Services 
0.483*** 
(3.89) 
0.124 
0.109 
(1.32) 
0.083 
0.416† 
(1.66) 
0.250 
Technology 
0.765*** 
(5.19) 
0.147 
-0.157 
(-1.10) 
0.143 
1.548*** 
(6.48) 
0.239 
Financials 
0.069 
(0.59) 
0.116 
-0.097 
(-1.47) 
0.066 
-0.047 
(-0.24) 
0.198 
Consumer 
Goods 
0.484*** 
(3.13) 
0.154 
-0.008 
(-0.10) 
0.086 
0.112 
(0.46) 
0.246 
Oil & Gas 
0.589*** 
(3.79) 
0.156 
-0.010 
(-0.13) 
0.084 
0.885*** 
(3.32) 
0.266 
R2 
(Adj. R2) 
0.88 
(0.87) 
 
0.73 
(0.69) 
 
0.37 
(0.34) 
 
Wald 
χ2 (14) 
1294.87*** 
(0.000) 
 
195.10*** 
(0.000) 
 
263.61*** 
(0.000) 
 
Sample Size 232  100  332  
†, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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In summary, results reported in Table 4 and 5 provide support to our hypothesis that 
executives who stand to gain substantially from an acquisition would actively seek to make 
their firms more attractive to a takeover bid. Our results provide support to the results 
reported by Larcker and Lambert (1985), Wade and O’Reilly (1990) and Singh and Harianto 
(1989), that managers use their power to secure their financial future with golden parachutes 
and change in control payments. Results reported in Table 6 show that the size of an 
executive’s potential change in control payments is unrelated to the firm’s attractiveness as a 
takeover target. Total assets are negatively related to both equity and cash and NPVar is 
statistically significant in explaining cash balance levels.  
6. Conclusion 
Using agency theory paradigm, Larcker and Lambert (1985) and Narayan and Sundaram 
(1998) argue that change in control payments exist primarily as an insurance policy for 
incumbent managers, should their firm ever be acquired. This view is also supported by 
Whisler (1984), Drucker (1974) and Lorsch (1989) who argue that executives are in complete 
control of firms and that shareholder and boards of directors are powerless. According to 
Hartzell et al. (2004), since the inception of golden parachutes, change in control payments 
have become a significant source of executive compensation during a takeover with some 
CEOs receiving up to nine times their annual salary. This study investigates whether change 
in control payments motivates some CEOs to actually desire their firm to be taken over.  
Using the US and Australian data, and employing OLS regression, we report that the firms 
with large change in control payments also tend to have large cash balances. This view is also 
supported by Hartzell et al. (2004). Our findings reported in Table 4 show that an increase in 
PayoutFactor (golden parachute provision) tends to have a positive effect on net cash balance, 
indicating that firms do hold high cash balances in order to be able to meet their obligation. 
However, results for total assets indicate that smaller firms hold higher net cash balances 
compared to larger firms. Earnings volatility (NPVAR) is positive, thus indicating that firms 
experiencing high volatility tend to hold higher net cash balances. Results reported in Table 5 
indicate that FactorPayout has a negative effect on the proportion of equity held by the 
shareholders. This suggests that managers do change the capital structure of the firm 
(proportion of debt and equity) in order to gain power of control. Our findings reported in 
Tables 6 support the view that managers that have substantial influence over their firms 
actually use this influence to get their firms to hold more cash and negotiate better change in 
control contracts. This enables the incumbent manager to use the extra cash for their personal 
use but also insure that their financial wellbeing is secured should the firm ever be acquired.  
We conclude that firms with greater cash levels offer change in control agreements as they 
are more able to afford them and having high golden parachute benefits allow CEOs to 
change the firms’ capital structure for their own benefits.  Overall, our finding supports the 
view that change in control agreements are implemented largely due to executives wanting an 
insurance policy and corporate governance is being relatively powerless to stop them.  
Finally, we wish to caution people from generalising the findings of this study as it is based 
on a small sample size. It is noted that this study is timely and deals with concerns regarding 
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CEO compensation, capital structure and governance issues. The extent to which companies 
can work to lift governance practices will provide opportunities for research in the future.  
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